

Computer Emergency Response Team
Industrie Services Tertiaire

Cyber Threat Landscape

www.cert-ist.com



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Agenda

- 0 – What is Cert-IST?
- 1 – Attackers and motives
 - Hacktivisms
 - Cyber-gang
 - Spies and State sponsored actors
- 2 – Examples of attacks
 - Ransomware and Crypto-jacking
 - Phishing
 - CEO Fraud
 - Advanced intrusion
- 3 – About defenses

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What is Cert-IST?



What is Cert-IST?

- Center dedicated to vulnerabilities and attacks mitigations
 - Cert-IST is a CERT team (Computer Emergency Response Team) for IST (Industries, Services and Tertiary sectors)
 - Located in France
- Cert-IST provides services to its members
 - Cyber Threats Watch & Alert , through:
 - Security advisories on vulnerabilities
 - Alerts about expected or on-going attacks
 - Datasheets on disclosed Attacks (with IOC : Indicators Of Compromise)
 - Daily press reviews and monthly & yearly reports on threat landscape
 - Support to deal with incidents
 - Share information on incidents
 - Technical expertise

Cert-IST ecosystem

The diagram illustrates the Cert-IST ecosystem, centered around the Cert-IST logo (operated by THALES). It is connected to four main categories:

- Other CERTs:** Includes logos for FIRST, TRUSTED, and INTRODUCER.
- Members:** Includes logos for orange Telcos, BNP PARIBAS Finance, Insurance, and ENGIE Utilities.
- Vendors:** Includes logos for Microsoft, Symantec, and McAfee.
- THALES Cyber-Security Operation Center:** Includes a photo of staff working at computers.

Key text points:

- Member of **FIRST** since 1999 (International network connecting 300+ CERTs across 70+ countries)
- Accredited member of **TF-CSIRT** (European network of CERTs)
- Sponsored several CERTs for admission to FIRST (Cert Tunisian state, BNP-Paribas, Orange)

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1 – Attackers and motives

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Who are the attackers? (and their motivations)

- Hacktivists (Activists)**
 - Claim / Protest
- Cyber Gangs**
 - Make money
- Spies & State Sponsored**
 - Power / Supremacy / World leadership

Anonymous
Syrian Electronic Army
Script-kiddies
Scammers
Professional & Mafia
Specialized Offensive Services
Gov Agencies
Cyber Defence

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Who are the victims?

Individuals
Companies

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Hacktivists




Motivations


- Political claims / Use IT attacks to protest or act
- Highly motivated, but limited resources

- **Actions**
 - Opportunist attacks on « low hanging fruits » to catch media attention
 - DDOS, web site Defacements, Doxing (publish companies internal data)
- **Examples**
 - DDOS of MasterCard and Visa (Anonymous – 2010)
 - Takeover of Twitter accounts (SEA – 2013)
 - E.g. New York Times and Huffington Post (UK)
- **Real threat for companies but on decline after 2013**
 - Very severe sentences against identified attackers

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Cyber Gangs



Motivations

- Make money
- Range from no-skill scammers to professional cyber-crime ecosystem (including: The Boss, Developers, Infrastructure Operators, Sellers, etc.)

- **Actions**
 - Scam : from Nigerian Prince (4-1-9 frauds) to CEO Fraud (BEC)
 - Ransomware, Crypto-jacking against individuals or single computer
 - Blackmail (DOS or IT Destruction) against companies
 - Advanced intrusions and extortion schemes (Bank heist)
 - Etc.
- **Target both individuals and companies**
 - Annoyances that could cost a lot of money

Uber paid \$100,000 for hackers' silence over huge data breach

6 August 2018 16:02 22 Nov, 2017 SHARE [TWITTER](#) [LINKEDIN](#) [f](#) [g+](#) [@](#)

SamSam: The (Almost) Six Million Dollar Ransomware

Sophos released a whitepaper that takes a deep dive into the SamSam ransomware attack that first appeared in December 2015

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Spies & State Sponsored actors



Motivations

- Economic/Industrial Spying, Politc Leadership, Offensive Cyber Defense
- Not limited to military activities. Now also in Industry and Citizen surveillance
- Offensive security is booming

• Actions


- USA vs China vs Russia vs Iran vs ...
- Fake news, disinformation and manipulation (e.g. USA elections)
- IP threat, Critical Infrastructures attacks

• Private companies are also at stake


- Major companies could be directly targeted
Smaller companies could be targeted as an entry point to major companies
- Attack could be very sophisticated (attackers have large budgets)

- Note: Gov. enforce new obligations to enhance security defenses
e.g. requirements for Critical Infrastructures or GDPR in Europe




















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Examples of State Sponsored Groups



Largest APT Groups

Unkn	Elise/Lotus Blossom		Iran	Charming Kitten
Unkn	DarkHotel		Iran	Clever Kitten
	APT 1/ Comment Panda / PLA61398		Iran	Flying Kitten
China	APT 2/ Putter Panda / PLA61486		Iran	Magic Kitten
China	APT 3/ Clandestine Fox / UPS/ Pirpi		Iran	Operation Cleaver
China	Axiom / APT 17 / Aurora		Iran	Rocket Kitten
China	Deep Panda / Shell Crew / APT 19		Iran	Shamoon
China	Dynamite Panda / APT 18		Russia	Blackenergy / Sandworm
China	Emissary Panda / Group 3390		Russia	Cozy Bear
China	Hurricane Panda		Russia	Havex/Energetic Bear/DragonFly
China	Numbered Panda / APT 12		Russia	Dukes / OnionDuke
China	Night Dragon		Russia	Pawn Storm / APT28 / Sofacy
	France Babar / Snowglobe		Russia	Snake/ Turfa
	Korea DarkSeoul		US	Equation Group
Korea	Silent Chollima		US	Regin
			US	Flame

• Source: Cyphort Labs 2015

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Cyber Threat Timeline

Evolution of attacks and motivations

2000 Massive viral attacks « playing with fire »

- Worms: CodeRed, Sasser, Slammer...

2005 Birth of Cyber-crim Underground economy

- Fuzzers, 0-Day, Black-market, Spam, Phishing, Skimmer...

2010 Cyber-espionage goes mainstream. Activism / Large scale attacks begin

- Activism: Anonymous
- APT & DDoS : Sony (DDoS)...
- State sponsored attacks: Stuxnet, Snowden
- Cyberdefense becomes a « must have »

2015 Data breaches multiple Cyber-surveillance: Security vs Privacy

- Activisme or Cyberwar ? : Sony Entertainment, TV5 Monde
- Data breaches: Target, Home Domino's...

2018 Ransomware & Cryptominers Cyberwar

- Locky, Cryptolocker
- Mobile Malwares – IoT
- APT28 : Russia vs the rest of the world
- Cyberdefence is strategic

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Recap & Takeaways (so far)

- Internet is great, but dangerous
 - Privacy is at risk (e.g. Gov, Google, etc..)
 - Bad guys try to attack individuals and companies
- We must be vigilant and stay aware of the potential threats.
Examples :
 - Be caution when downloading (free) stuff on Internet (use official sources only)
 - Report attack attempts if something odd has occurred (e.g. Spear-Phishing)
- Security products are not foolproof and we are a key part of the security defenses


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2 – Examples of Attacks



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Ransomware & Crypto-jacking

- They are the most common attacks today
- Ransomware :
 - Pay a ransom to get your files back
 - Now tries to infect large organisations (Hospitals, City administration, etc.) with RansomWorm
- Cryptojacking (Crypto-money Hijacking)
 - Illegally use CPUs to mine crypto-money (Mostly « Monero » instead of « Bitcoins »)
 - Large farms of infected CPUs required to make enough money (including Amazon AWS, Docker, etc..)
- Microsoft Technicians Scams





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Phishing

- Please, give me your password
- Or any attempt to trap a email recipient
 - Check your Bank account
 - Open this attachment
 - Go on that web site
- Phishing vs Spear-phishing



Cyber Criminals are 'fishers of men' what's the difference?


PHISHING
IS A BROAD, AUTOMATED ATTACK THAT IS LESS SOPHISTICATED.

SPEAR-PHISHING
IS A CUSTOMIZED ATTACK ON A SPECIFIC EMPLOYEE & COMPANY

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Phishing examples

- CEO Fraud (aka BEC: Business Email Compromise)
- Cyber-espionage attempt (here: Chinese APT « Lotus Blossom »)

From: Free Invitation Palo Alto Networks
Sent: Wednesday, October 26, 2016 11:19 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [FREE INVITATION] CyberSecurity Summit on Thursday, 3 November 2016 at JW Marriott Jakarta.
Time: 8:00 am - 5:00pm



Register Now Before Time Runs Out
Time is running out to register for the Cyber Security Summit in Jakarta on November 3. Register today to learn from local and global experts how you can protect your way of life in the digital age and get answers to all your cybersecurity questions.
With thanks to our Sponsors, Aruba, Gigamon, Pure Storage and VMware along with Master

Secure your digital way of life today.
REGISTER NOW
Date: 3 November 2016
Time: 8:00am - 5:00pm
Venue: JW Marriott Hotel, Jakarta


From: Company CEO <company.ceo@example.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 5 October 2016 1:02 PM
To: Company CIO <company.cio@example.com>
Subject: Request for 5th October 2016

Hi,
Are you at your desk? I need you to process an international wire transfer for me. Kindly code it to "admin expenses" by COB today.
Thanks
Sent from my iPhone

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Advanced intrusions

- Use elaborated intrusion scenario
 - From the beginning in the espionage world (aka J. Bond 007)
 - Goes mainstream in 2010
 - Often called « APT » : Advanced Persistent Threat




- Intrusion can last 200 days (Staying under the radar)
 - Prepare
 - Infect one computer (« patient zero »)
 - Lateral movement within the company
 - Exfiltrate, sabotage, etc.

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
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Examples of an Advanced intrusions

- December 2013 : Target retailer incident



[source: SecurityIntelligence.com]

- Rely on
 - Spear-phishing
 - Stealing Windows credentials
 - Supply-chain attack

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- **Exemples**
 - International competitors: e.g. Coca-Cola vs China Huiyuan Juice Group (2009)
 - Bank robbing: Carbanack (2013), Bangladesh Bank (2016),
 - Industrial Systems sabotage: Stuxnet (2010), BlackEnergy(2015), Triton (2017)
 - TV5-Monde blackout, Elysée (2017), Sony Entertainment Network sabotage (2014)

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2.3 - Attaque Stuxnet (2010)

(mécanismes de propagation)

Recherche des :
 • PC utilisant Siemens SIMATIC PCS 7
 • PLC d'un type particulier

Rootkit Windows via « s7otbxd.dll »
 Rootkit sur le PLC

[2] Propagation
 • Dépôt sur un partage puis MS10-061 (Print Spooler)
 • MS08-067 (Conficker)
 • via <projectname>.s7p
 • via MS SQL-Server (WinCC)

[1] Infection via USB (MS10-046 - .LNK)

PC + Siemens PCS7

PC

PC

PC

C&C

[3] Dialogue
 • HTTP vers un C&C
 • P2P via MS-RPC entre machines infectées

[4] Infection du PLC

PLC Siemens (S7-315 ou S7-417)

[5] Pilote les équipements via le bus industriel Profibus

Cibles = Centrifugeuses du centre d'enrichissement nucléaire iranien de Natanz

Nbre de postes infectés ? :
 • 14 000 pour Symantec
 • 50 000 pour Microsoft
 En Iran, Indonésie, Indes, etc

www.mypremierfutbol.com
 et www.todaysfutbol.com

Com
Indu

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3 – About Defenses



Attacker vs Defender: Who has the advantage?




- Attacker only needs to exploit the weakest link to infiltrate company's network


- Defender only needs to detect one trace left by the attacker to start hunting



- *Note: idea taken from Tom Ueltschi (@c_APT_ure)*

 **Defense Evolutions**

- Changes in technologies (over years):




- Also shows a change of mindset

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 **How France is strengthening its defenses**

- La France renforce ses référentiels sécurités
 - 2010: RGS (Référentiel Général de Sécurité) pour les administrations françaises
 - 2016 : LPM (Loi de Programmation Militaire) pour les OIV (Operateurs Importance Vitale)
 - 2018 : RGPD pour les sites manipulant des données personnelles
 - 2018 : NIS (Network & Information Security directive) pour les OSE (Operateurs Services Essentiels)

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Hot topics for security

- Protect users against phishing
- Attacks via supply chain
- Data leak via Cloud infrastructure (Amazon AWS / S3)
- Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and OT (Operational Technologies)
- IoT (Internet of Things)


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4 – To Conclude






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- A complex situation for enterprises
 - Users need more flexibility
 - While cyber attacks get smarter and stronger


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Pieces of advice

- For users
 - Know the risks: Keep informed on common attack scenarios
 - Act responsibly: Choose strong passwords, etc.
 - Alert when you suspect an attack attempt
- For System Owners, Architects and Developers
 - Start your design with « What will happen when the intrusion will succeed? »
What about data privacy and how to limit the incident from spreading?
 - Keep systems up to date: Patch, patch, patch !
- For Companies
 - Monitor security events to detect incident early (reduce « Mean Time To Detect »)
 - Fast reaction is good, but « levels 2 & 3 » analysis are required to spot out the real incidents
 - Share incident patterns with other companies : « Sharing is Caring »

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Beyond Defenses !

Defenses

- Look at the outside.
=> Know the threats
- Monitor inside assets
=> Security supervision
- React
=> Incident Handling

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Image Sources



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